

CONFIDENTIAL

21 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Chief, Interdepartmental Affairs Staff, OPP

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Poland, 22 December 1981

1. We have received notification that the President will chair an NSC meeting on Poland tomorrow at 1415. There is no indication yet when we might expect a paper for the meeting, but I expect it won't be until tomorrow morning. Therefore, I propose having your NSC books available no later than 1315 tomorrow to include the following:

- any papers we receive from the NSC staff
- the latest from the Task Force on the current situation in Poland [redacted]

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2. Please let me know if you will need the material earlier. Doris informed me that you most likely will leave the Agency about 1345. Should we get the paper for the meeting early in the morning, I will get it to you right away. [redacted]


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3. I just heard from Haig's staff that the meeting may be postponed until Wednesday. [redacted]

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cc: D/OPP



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MEETING INFORMATION

ES/MI # 81

21 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : Meetings

Type of Meeting : NSC  
 Date : Tuesday, 22 December 1981  
 Time : 2:15 - 3:15  
 Place : Cabinet Room  
 Chaired By : President  
 Principal Only? : Yes  
 Subject/Agenda : Poland

1:45 (F.D.)  
 1:15

When to Expect Papers: Will advise

Time Info Received : Per Kathy McGraw, NSC Staff, 2:40 p.m.

Distribution:

O/DCI (Doris)  
 O/DDCI (Eleanor)  
 D/NFAC (Sherry)  
 Ch/NIC  
 DDO (Marge)  
 D/OPP (Lu)  
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 OCO/SOO  
 ES  
 D/ES

Anne

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22 December 1981

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM: Harry Rowen, Chairman/NIC

SUBJECT: Possible Actions Against  
the USSR

1. These two papers on possible actions against the USSR were prepared by State for today's NSC meeting. The proposed position is extraordinarily weak and shilly-shallying (see, for instance, part 4 assessment). The main need is to decide on a set of more-than-symbolic unilateral US actions which would then serve as the foundation for getting the Europeans to do something.

2. I haven't had time to sort out which actions would be most appropriate but it is pretty clear that anything that would hurt the Soviet Union is likely to be painful for ourselves also. The stakes are high and it is worth accepting some pain.

  
Harry Rowen

SECRET